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court refuted this argument by asserting that the insurer was the
real party in interest at least to the extent of its coverage,6 3 and
that defendant could claim any medical payments made as an offset
against damages.6 4
In disposing of the case the court issued a strong warning:
the carrier will not be permitted to use its medical payments obligation
as a means of clandestine discovery. .

.

. [W]hen a matter is in suit

the carrier's representative has an obligation to deal with an adverse
litigant only through his attorneys even though the subject be medical
payments and nothing more.65

To do otherwise would
be a violation of Canon 9 of the Canons
66
of Professional Ethics.
CPLR 3121.: Section supersedes appellate division rules.
In Pipersv. Rosenow, 7 a medical malpractice action, the appellate division, second department, affirmed an order directing plaintiff to submit to a physical examination pursuant to CPLR 3121.63
In so doing, the court concluded that the introductory paragraph
and Part Four of its Rules which purports to preclude physical
examinations and the exchange of medical reports in dental or
medical malpractice actions has been superseded by CPLR 3121,
which does
not exclude such actions from the scope of its ap69
plication.

The second department's holding was foreshadowed by several
lower court decisions 70 which correctly reasoned that, in the face of
63 See Thrasher v. United States Liab. Ins. Co., 19 N.Y.2d 159, 225 N.E.
2d 503, 278 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1967).
64See Moore v. Leggette, 24 App. Div. 2d 891, 264 N.Y.S.2d 765
(2d Dep't 1965), aff'd, 18 N.Y.2d 864, 222 NE.2d 737, 276 N.Y.S.2d 118
(1966).
65 56 Misc. 2d at 648, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 871.
66 Canon 9 provides that a lawyer should not in any way communicate
upon the subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel.
67 30 App. Div. 2d 690, 292 N.Y.S.2d 63 (2d Dep't 1968).
68 For a discussion of the scope of CPLR 3121 see The Bianniwl Survey
of New York Practice, 40 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 122, 161 (1965).
69 See 3 WmNsTII,
KoRN & MIUER, Nmv YORK Civn PRACTIcE
3121 (1965).
70 DeCastro v. City of New York, 54 Misc. 2d 1007, 284 N.Y.S.2d 281
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1967); Mackey v. Holy Family Hosp., 52 Misc. 2d
770, 276 N.Y.S.2d 893 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1967); Fiori v. Bay Ridge
Sanitorium, Inc., 48 Misc. 2d 318, 264 N.Y.S.2d 421 (Sup. Ct Kings
County 1965).
The first department courts have reached a similar conclusion.
Sommers v. Federation of Jewish Philanthropies, 56 Misc. 2d
529, 289 N.Y.S.2d 96 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1968).

1969]

THE QUARTERLY SURVEY

a conflict between the Rules and the CPLR, the CPLR would
govern.71
CPLR 3123: Court excuses failure to respond to notice to admit.
Under CPLR 3123, notice to admit, a party may serve his
adversary with a written request to admit matters of fact so as to
expedite the trial by eliminating the necessity of proving matters
not in dispute.7 2 If no reply is made within twenty days, or at a
time set by the court, the matters contained in the notice to admit
are deemed admitted. If the answering party finds it difficult to
categorically admit or deny, he can so state in a sworn statement
specifying his claim.7 3 Under subdivision (b) a party may apply
to the court to amend or withdraw his admission,7 4 and any
admissions made are subject to all pertinent objections to admissibility which may be interposed at trial.
In Marguess v. City of New York75 defendant city failed to
respond to plaintiff's notice to admit but, the appellate division, first
department, nevertheless affirmed dismissal of the complaint. Relying heavily on that portion of subdivision (b) which allows an
objection to admissibility to be made, the majority excused the
defendant's total failure to respond on the ground that plaintiff's
demands, relating to questions of ultimate liability, were not attuned
to any reasonable belief that they
were free from substantial dis76
pute, and thus, admissible matter.
The dissent interpreted the provisions of 3123 to mean that
defendant's failure to respond to the notice to admit established a
prima facie case against it. Deeming the trial court to lack the
power to excuse a total failure to comply with the demand, subdivision (b) was construed as intended merely to reserve for the
trial court questions as to relevancy, materiality and competency of
71 CPLR 101 states that the CPLR "govern[s] the procedure in civil
judicial proceedings in all courts of the state and before all judges, except
where the procedure is regulated by inconsistent statute."
72 In re Collins, 31 Misc. 2d 754, 222 N.Y.S.2d 89 (Surr. Ct. N.Y.
County 1961); WACHTELL, Nmv Yom PRAcTiCE UNDER THE CPLR 264

(2d ed. 1966).

73See Sidclair Realty Co. v. Schor, 95 N.Y.S.2d 839 (App. T. 1st Dep't
1950); In re Luckenbach, 196 Misc. 782, 96 N.Y.S.2d 244 (Surr. Ct. Kings

County 1949); Solof v. City of New York, 181 Misc. 956, 49 N.Y.S.2d
921 (App. T. 2d Dep't 1944).
74 CPLR 3103 is also applicable to 3123 so that the answering party
can attack the notice to admit in this way. See The Quarterly Survey

of New York Practice, 42 ST. JoHN's L. RPv. 436, 455-56 (1968).
7 30 App. Div. 2d 782, 291 N.Y.S2d 956 (1st Dep't 1968).

In re Kelly, 33 Misc. 2d 16, 19, 225 N.Y.S.2d 896, 898 (Surr.
Ct. N.Y. County 1962).
76See

